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Minority Representation: A Political
or Judicial Question
MALCOLM E. JmvELL*
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v.
Sims' and in the accompanying cases has left no doubt about the
Court's basic philosophy in apportionment problems: "The Equal
Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal state
legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well
as all races."2 In implementation of this principle, the Court has
determined that both houses of a bicameral legislature must be
apportioned according to population, there must be periodic
reapportionment, the boundaries of political units such as counties
may be respected unless the consequence is serious population
inequalities, and popular votes in support of an inequitable
apportionment may be judicially ignored because a minority of
voters has as much right to equal protection of the laws as
a majority does.'
In its decisions the Supreme Court has been concerned entirely with achieving as much equality in the population of districts as is practicable. Although the Court has spoken about
districts of equal population, it has implicitly assumed that if a
district elects two legislators, it should have twice the population
of a district electing one legislator. Underlying the Court's
thinking, and implicit in the judicial slogan "one man, one vote,"
seems to be the belief that each legislator ought to represent
or "stand for" an equal number of voters. "Simply stated, an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the
State."4
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky.

1377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2 Id. at 568.

3 Id.at 576-84. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713, 737 (1964).
4 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
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The right of a person to equal protection of the laws is an
individual right, and the Court has defined the question of apportionment in terms of the weight accorded to an individual's
vote. But the legislative process is not so simple, nor is the relationship between legislator and constituent so direct. Legislators are, in practice, responsive to group pressures, and the
legislative output is a result of coalitions of minority interests.
Most state legislatures are organized primarily along partisan
lines, and in some states the majority legislative party votes on
many issues with sufficient cohesion to achieve most of its aims.5
One of the major consequences of reapportionment in many
states will be to change the balance of partisan power in the
legislature. Although the Supreme Court has defined the apportionment issue in terms of individual rights, its decisions and
those of lower courts are filled with facts and judgments about
the underrepresentation of a class of voters-those living in
metropolitan counties.
In a sense the legislator serves as a representative of all the
persons in his district, but there is evidence to show that legislators are often more responsive to the demands of the majority
of voters who voted for them than to those of the minority who
did not. When there are conflicting viewpoints and interests in
a constituency, a legislator need not-and can not-satisfy all.
Veteran legislators, in particular, know which groups in the constituency provide the necessary votes for re-election, and they
are likely to cater to the demands of these groups.6
DIsTmcTNG AND WASTED VOTES
A consequence of these legislative realities is that the voter
who chooses a winner has greater weight in the legislature than
one who chooses a loser. Although it is possible that a close
vote in a district may make a legislator more sensitive to
minority viewpoints, it is substantially correct to say that a vote
for a losing legislative candidate is a wasted vote. In two-party
elections the nature of the districts will determine how many
votes are wasted by each party. Only under some form of proThe State Legislature 48-62 (1962).
Miller, Majority Rule and the Representative System (Unpublished paper,
presented at the 1962 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.)
6SJewell,
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portional representation does neither party waste a substantial
number of votes, and the Illinois House is the only state legislature using such a system. Under a single-member district
system, the minority party usually wastes more votes than the
majority party. If partisan strength were evenly distributed
across a state, the minority party would theoretically win no
elections in single-member districts and would waste all of its
votes. In practice, partisan strength is unevenly distributed, but
the minority party usually gets a smaller percentage of legislative seats than its proportion of the vote. It is not always recognized that multi-member districts (in the absence of proportional
representation) give the majority party an even greater advantage and waste more minority votes. The larger the size and
number of multi-member districts, the more pockets of minority
strength are swallowed up and the larger number of voters
there are in the minority party who are unrepresented by a
man of their choice. In 18 of the state senates and 88 of the lower
houses some use is made of multi-member districts.
The use of districts results inevitably in the wasting of votes
and almost always handicaps the minority party. But it is possible for the majority party to maximize the wasting of minority
votes by a skillful drawing of district boundaries. This is the
pracice known as gerrymandering. The boundaries may be drawn
so that minority party strength is spread thinly among a number
of districts, or if the minority is too strong to make that feasible,
its voting strength may be concentrated to produce lopsided
majorities in one of a few districts and to insure majority con-7
trol of the remainder. Either practice achieves the same goal.
An equally or more effective way to waste minority votes is for
the majority party to enact a districting law that makes use of
at-large districts, at least in multi-member counties where the
majority party is strong.
Although the effects of any districting pattern on a partisan
minority are more obvious and more measurable, districting has
similar effects on other minorities. When a district is formed
that includes a populous county and a sparsely populated one,
or an urban majority and a suburban minority, or a large number
of white voters and a smaller number of Negroes, the minority
7 Hacker, Congressional Districting 46-62 (1963).
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group in that district has less chance than the majority to select
a legislator who is responsive to its interests. Members of any
minority group, like supporters of a minority party, are likely
to be disadvantaged by any method of districting; but it is also
possible that a majority in the legislature will draw district
boundaries with the deliberate purpose of minimizing the representation of one or more minority groups. Gerrymandering
may be used against groups as well as against a party, though
the effects are not exactly the same. In any district where it constitutes a minority, a party's votes are wasted; but a group or
interest may be able to exercise influence over a legislator or
even hold the balance of power in his selection though it has
less than a majority position in a given district.

Is TnzRE A

RIGHT To AN EFFECTV

VoTE?

The issue that will eventually be faced by the Supreme Court
is whether a person's right to vote for legislators is unconstitutionally impaired by a districting pattern that makes his vote
ineffective by minimizing his chance of electing the legislator
whom he prefers. In apportionment cases the courts are concerned with the rights of individuals, not counties, parties, or
interest groups. But the practical effect of an apportionment
not based on population can be measured only in terms of the
reduced representation of urban or metropolitan counties in the
legislature. Likewise, the practical effect of a districting pattern
can be measured only in terms of the underrepresentation of
Republican voters or Negro voters, for example, as a class. No
representative system could assure the representation of every
interest, however small, and only proportional representation
avoids wasting a substantial percentage of votes. It is extremely
unlikely that any court would consider imposing on the legislatures a system so completely foreign to American state legislative experience.
The Supreme Court is not likely to impose any single type of
district on the legislatures. The only question likely to receive
serious judicial consideration is whether some patterns of districting dilute the effectiveness of a substantial minority so
severely, and perhaps so deliberately, as to constitute "invidious
discrimination"-the standard used by Justice Douglas in the
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Baker case." The minority that draws judicial attention might
be a partisan one, because the partisan effects of districting are
both clear and significant. The minority might be a racial one,
because the Court-ever since the Gomillion case 9-has been
sensitive to the effect of districting on the Negro voter. The issue
of minority representation has been present in several cases in
the lower courts and in a few that have come within the purview
of the Supreme Court. But the issue has yet to be presented before any court in all its complexity. The problems of representing
both partisan and Negro minorities will be examined in this article
with respect to: 1) drawing boundaries for single-member districts, and 2) determining whether to use multi-member districts. In each case we shall be concerned with the advisability
of the Court's extending the equal protection clause to encompass these cases and the standards it might use if it chooses to
do so.
GERRYR IANDMNG:
IN SEARCH OF A STAMD

The Baker decision removed the issue of apportionment from
the category of "political" questions, but it did not challenge
the principle that certain categories of cases are nonjusticiable
because they involve political questions.' 0 It can be argued that
gerrymandering, whether applied against a partisan or racial
minority, is a political matter. It is political in the popular sense
of that word. Traditionally in the legislatures the determination
of district boundaries within a county has been the result of
bargaining anmong the partisan, ethnic, and personal interests
involved. One of the familiar legislative norms is that a majority party draws the district boundaries in such a way as to
help its chances in subsequent elections, although in some states
blatant gerrymandering is frowned upon and in others the legislators show more interest in protecting incumbents of both parties
than in advancing partisan interests.
A Judicially Discoverable Standard? It can be argued, more
forcefully, that gerrymandering meets one of the criteria of a
political question specified in Baker v. Carr: "a lack of judicially
8Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 244 (1962).
9 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
10 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-18 (1962).
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discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."" There
is an ideal and readily apparent standard for determining the size
of districts; it is perfect equality, and it is relatively easy to
measure how closely an apportionment approaches it. What is
the ideal standard for distributing Republican and Democratic
voters among precincts? How many votes of each party should
be wasted? There is no standard available in democratic theory
or in legislative practice. Moreover, one party may have its
strength so concentrated in certain parts of a county that almost
any districting pattern will produce lopsided majorities in a few
districts. Alternatively, voters belonging to one party may be so
thinly and evenly distributed throughout a county that no method
of districting could assure them of a single seat in the county.
It is not even clear, in some circumstances, whether a given
arrangement helps or hurts a party. The gerrymander is a political weapon that often backfires. If the districts are drawn so as
to concentrate minority party strength in a minimum number of
districts, the minority may waste votes but it is assured a nucleus
of legislators able to withstand any political landslide and to
develop seniority in the legislature. If the minority party's
strength were dispersed by giving it about forty-five per cent
of the vote in several districts, a shift in the political tides might
give it a majority in all districts. Since a political party in the
minority can be handicapped if its strength is either too concentrated or too dispersed, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine what kinds of districts in a given situation discriminate
least against the minority.
It would be even more difficult for a court to determine
standards for districting that would not discriminate against
Negro voters. The heavy concentration of Negro voters in a few
sections of most cities makes it difficult to disperse Negro voting
strength among a large number of districts. There might very
possibly be differences among Negro political leaders concerning
the districting tactics that could best serve Negro interests. Should
their votes be concentrated in a few districts to assure the election of some Negro legislators or more widely dispersed to give
Negro voters an influence over the choice of a larger number of
legislators? In any case involving alleged gerrymandering against
11 Id. at 217.
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Negroes, the courts lack not only a standard for balancing
majority and minority interests, but even a dependable method for
determining what districting pattern best serves minority interests.
A Policy Question. The Supreme Court, in the Baker case,
provided another pertinent criterion of a nonjusticiable political
question: "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."'2
Some aspects of districting clearly involve policy questions.
Should the legislature, as a matter of policy, seek to create districts that are comparatively homogeneous in population characteristics: urban-rural, economic, ethnic? Rational arguments can
be presented on either side of this question. In the more homogeneous district the legislator has better opportunities to gauge
the viewpoints of constituents, and fewer constituents are unrepresented by a legislator sensitive to their views. Elections
are likely to be more one-sided, with the result that a larger
proportion of legislators develop seniority and become skilled in
their profession. In the less homogeneous district the legislator is
less likely to become the spokesman for a few narrow interests.
There is likely to be closer competition between the parties and
consequently a better chance for the voters to remove a legislator
who is not performing satisfactorily. The legislature may not
actually weigh these arguments when it draws district boundaries,
but the act of districting has these policy implications. If a court
sought to review legislation establishing district lines, it would
be forced to determine these questions of policy, at least implicitly.
judicial Views of Partisan Gerrymandering. The Supreme
Court has not provided any hint in its apportionment decisions
that there might be a judicial remedy for partisan gerrymandering, although it has implicitly criticized gerrymandering in de13
fending the use of political and historical boundaries to avoid it.
After the Supreme Court in June of 1964 had determined that
the Delaware apportionment was invalid and had remanded the
case to the three-judge district court, the legislature of that state
adopted a new apportionment law. Plaintiffs asserted that the
121bid.
'3

Reymolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).
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new law amounted to a gerrymander against the Republicans.
The district court agreed to hear testimony on this question,
which it termed "almost completely unexplored," but at this
writing it has reached no final decision.' 4
The Legacy of Gomillion. The Supreme Court has twice
considered cases involving alleged racial gerrymanders. In the
1960 case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot the Court invalidated an
Alabama statute that had changed the municipal boundaries of
Tuskegee because the clear intent and consequence of the law
was "the unequivocal withdrawal of the vote solely from colored
citizens." 5 The decision is pertinent because it demonstrates the
Court's sensitivity to legislation that discriminates against Negro
voters. But the discriminatory effect of the Alabama statutecompletely removing Negro voters from the cities-was far
greater and more clearly measurable than any districting law
that determines what proportion of. Negroes will be on either
side of a legislative district boundary.
The Supreme Court was confronted with the first allegation
of racial gerrymandering among legislative districts in the 1964
case of Wright v. Rockefeller.16 At issue were the boundaries of
four congressional districts in New York City, in one of which the
Negro and Puerto Rican population constituted a large majority
and in three of which they were a small minority. It was claimed
that the districts were deliberately drawn to create racially segregated areas and that, as a consequence, the districting law
violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. In a seventwo decision, the Supreme Court accepted the findings of the
district court majority that there was no proof that the legislature "was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact
drew the districts on racial lines." 7 The brief majority opinion,
written by Justice Black, took note of the fact that the concentration of Negro and Puerto Rican citizens in one district was
related to their concentrated residence and was satisfactory to
some spokesmen for minority groups (including Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell, who was permitted to intervene in the
14Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964). Sincock v. Roman, 233 F. Supp.
615 (D. Del. 1964)
15 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
16376 U.S. 52 (1964).

17 Id. at 56.
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case)."s Although Justice Black's comments suggest that he recognized the difficulty of developing criteria for judging racial
gerrymandering, the majority opinion does not deal directly
with the critical issues at stake.
The appellants in the case argued primarily that segregation
of congressional districts by race violates the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion
concurred in by justice Goldberg, accepted this argument and
compared congressional districts to other important public areas,
such as schools, parks, and courtrooms, where segregation should
be prohibited.'" The comparison is not a helpful one. It is difficult to understand what an electoral district has in common
with a public facility. The problems of representation are distinct from the need for maintaining equal and non-segregated
public services for persons of all races. The term "segregation"
is a misleading and an inappropriate one to be applied to congressional districts.
Judge Moore, in one of the majority opinions of the divided
district court, declared that the concentration of a minority racial
group in one district was constitutional if there was no underrepresentation of that group, and he noted that such concentration might be desirable because it enabled the racial group "to
obtain representation in legislative bodies which otherwise would
be denied to them."20 justices Douglas and Clark disagreed
with this position, and in their separate opinions each declared
that, if the districts are segregated, it is "irrelevant" whether the
effect is to strengthen or weaken Negro representation." Justice
Black, in the majority opinion, completely avoided the question.
The consequence is that we do not know whether a majority of
the Supreme Court Justices, if they believed that legislative
districts weer drawn along racial lines, would consider that the
effectiveness of the minority group's votes was a pertinent constitutional issue or, if so, how they would measure this effectiveness. Nor does the Wright case provide any clue to the Court's
attitude should it be argued that a pattern of districting minisId. at 57-58.
19
Id. at 62.
2
0Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
21
Wright v. Rockefeller, 876 U.S. 52, 62, 69 (1964).
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imizes Negro voting strength by dissipating it among many
districts.
Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion probes the issue more
deeply and constitutes a judgment about one of the most fundamental policy questions in a representative system. Douglas
criticized the practice of deliberately creating homogeneous
legislative districts to assure that ethnic or other minorities have
representation; "government has no business designing electoral
districts along racial or religious lines." His reasoning is as follows:
When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the
multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution
seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms
that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues
are generated; communities seek not the best representative
but the best racial or religious partisan. Since that system
is at 2war
with the democratic ideal, it should find no footing
2
here.
Though Justice Douglas may be articulating only a single
view of the "democratic ideal," his words deserve attention because they represent the first effort by a Justice of the Supreme
Court to grapple with the fundamental problem of minority
representation in the legislature. If Douglas's viewpoint were
accepted by the other Justices, the Court would refuse to invalidate not only a districting law that dispersed Negro voting
strength among many districts but also legislation (discussed
below) that minimized Negro political strength by creating
large multi-member districts. It is also important to note that
Douglas's criticism applies explicitly to a districting pattern
that protects a racial minority rather than one that benefits a
partisan minority.
MuLTi-MFMmRa DisTacTs AND MiNomrs

Questions of Policy. The initial question that faces the courts
in determining whether multi-member districts infringe on constitutional rights is whether the issue is essentially a political
one. We may repeat the questions derived from the Baker case:
Are there judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
deciding the question, and does a decision depend on the reso22

Id. at 67.
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lution of nonjudicial policy questions? Justice Harlan, dissenting
in Reynolds v. Sims, has asserted: "No judicially manageable
standard can determine whether a State should have singlemember districts or multi-member districts or some combination
of both." 3 It should be possible, however, unlike the case of
gerrymandering, to determine what effect a multi-member district
has on minorities in a particular county. A study of voting and
population data in a county would make it possible to estimate
what proportion of a given number of districts would be likely
to contain a majority of Republicans or of Negroes, for example,
if a multi-member district were divided into single-member districts. It is obvious, for example, that the larger the number of
legislators elected in one multi-member district, the greater the
disadvantage (compared to the single-member district plan) for
a minority of any given size.
The obstacle to judicial resolution of this issue is not so much
the lack of standards as the policy implications inherent in any
decision about multi-member or single-member districts. These
policy implications are important though they are little understood and there has been little research done concerning the
effect of districting patterns on the political and legislative systems.
The use of multi-member districts is often defended as a
means of assuring that the legislators will serve county-wide
needs and will vote as a bloc in the legislature, instead of representing varied-and possibly conflicting-parochial interests. It
might be argued, on the other hand, that a variety of interests
in a large metropolitan county deserve representation. In fact,
there is no evidence from research on the legislative process to
show whether legislators from a multi-member district consistently vote with greater or less unity than those from a comparable county having single-member districts.24 There are conflicting opinions about the relationship between legislator and
constituents. Does a constituent have better access to a single
legislator living in his district, or are his opportunities for influence greater when he can choose one of several legislators in
a larger district to approach? In a metropolitan county the legis23 377 U.S. 583, 621 (1964).

24 See Silva, Compared Values of the Single- and the Multi-Member Legislatfive District, 17 Western Political Quarterly 504-16 (1964).
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lator who represents the whole county may be better able to
communicate with and be more visible to his constituents
through the press and radio than one who is theoretically closer
to the voters in a single-member district. We can conjecture
about legislative-constituent roles and relationships, but we
have no evidence.
There have been studies of the effect of districts on legislative tenure, but they have failed to demonstrate that it has any
consistent effect.2 5 There is evidence from a few states to suggest that an at-large system increases the number of candidates
(per seat) in legislative primaries.2" In states where candidates
in at-large elections must designate a specific "place" or "position"
for which they are running, this technique has the effect of channeling most candidates in legislative primaries into races for
which there is no incumbent. 7 The encouragement of greater
competition or the safeguarding of legislative seniority is a policy
choice that the legislature should make, but the effect of particular districting patterns on these matters remains largely obscure. The use of an at-large district in a multi-member county
eliminates the necessity of redistricting to accommodate population changes within the county and makes gerrymandering
impossible though it may handicap a minority more than gerrymandering would.
Multi-member districts undoubtedly affect the legislative
system in a variety of ways, but the only effect that can be
clearly established is a decline in the minority party's chances
of electing any of its candidates and in a minority group's chances
of securing legislators who are particularly sensitive to its interests. In a metropolitan county using single-member districts
the minority party will win some seats if its voting strength
is sufficiently concentrated and if it is not the victim of gerrymandering. In multi-member districts the minority party rarely
elects any legislators because most voters cast a straight-party
ballot in legislative races. A partisan division in the district
delegation arises only when there is a very close balance in the
25 Ibid.

26Jewell, Competition and Factionalismin Southern Legislative Primariesand
Elections (Unpublished, presented at the 1962 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.)
27 Ibid.
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vote or when a minority party candidate is unusually popular.
A study of 84 multi-member House districts in four states (Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, and West Virginia) for periods of
three to five elections shows that in less than 5 per cent of the
elections was there a partisan division in the district delegation.
The Effect on Minorities. The partisan implications of multimember districting are significant. In severaal northern states
the Democrats have gained an advantage partially offsetting
the underrepresentation of metropolitan counties, and in some
southern states the use of at-large districts has minimized Republican representation. The effect is most clearly shown when
a large metropolitan county constitutes a single house district,
as has been true in such states as Indiana, West Virginia, and
New Jersey. A single party has sometimes been able to win
the eleven seats in Marion county (Indianapolis), the eleven
seats in Kanawha county (Charleston), or the nine seats in Essex
county (Newark) with margins averaging only a few thousand
votes for the winning ticket. In metropolitan counties that are
divided into several multi-member districts, the majority party's
advantage is reduced. But in Wayne county (Detroit), which
until recently was divided into twenty-one districts electing
one, two, or three men each, the Democrats have sometimes
been able to elect almost an entire slate of legislators. The recent constitutional convention in Michigan, where the Republicans had a large majority, adopted single-member districts for
the state. The Michigan legislature also illustrates another possible effect of multi-member districts. In the past the Republican
minority has been so underrepresented in metropolitan county
delegations that the Republican legislative party has been almost
exclusively rural. (The effect of the single-member district
system in rural Michigan has been to underrepresent Democrats
and make the Democratic legislative party almost completely
metropolitan in orientation.)"
The effect of multi-member districts on Negro minorities can
be most clearly illustrated in the South. Although the Negro
vote in much of the rural South remains small, in many of the
metropolitan counties it is assuming substantial proportions. In
28 Lamb, Pierce, and White, Apportionment and Representative InstitutionsThe Michigan Experience 809-32 (1963).
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the near future it is unlikely that a majority of the voters in
any southern metropolitan county will be Negro, and it is unlikely that many Negro legislators will be elected in constituencies having a majority of white voters. Negro political influence
may be brought to bear on white legislators, but it is unlikely
that Negro legislators will be elected except in metropolitan
counties that have been divided into single-member or small
multi-member districts. Two border states, Oklahoma and Kentucky, use single-member districts (in the case of Kentucky,
exclusively). As a consequence Louisville has frequently had a
Negro in the legislature. New Orleans has been the only metropolitan county in the South using districts. That county elects
one or two house member from each of its seventeen wards.
Every other southern metropolitan county having more than
one member in either house has elected legislators county-wide.
The only exception is in senatorial districts in Georgia, as a consequence of recent judicial intervention described below.
The effects of multi-member districts on both partisan and
racial minorities can be illustrated by the 1964 legislative election
in Georgia. Fulton county (Atlanta) is divided into seven senatorial districts. Republican senators were elected in two districts
by substantial margins, and Negro Democrats were elected in two
other districts, one of which had a small margin of white registered voters. The three representatives, elected at large, were
all white Democrats who defeated Republican candidates by a
margin of about sixty-two per cent.
The issues presented by multi-member districts are questions of policy. The structure of the legislators, the nature of legislative parties, and the struggle of various interests for political
power are all affected by the use of multi-member districts.
At the same time the use of multi-member districts diminishes
the effectiveness of the vote cast by members of a partisan or
racial minority. Particularly in a populous county that constitutes one multi-member district, a partisan or racial majority
may have a voice in choosing legislators far out of proportion
to its numerical strength. The large multi-member district has
an effect on minority representation that is far more direct,
measurable, and substantial than any effect of gerrymandering.
judicial Concern with Multi-Member Districts. We can find
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recent examples of judicial interest in the question of multimember districts, but at this writing the courts have provided no
answer to the critical question of minority representation.29 In
fact, this question seems to have largely escaped judicial attention. The Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. Sims, noted approvingly
that fleability might be achieved and some distinction maintained between upper and lower houses through the use of multimember districts in some cases.3 In the Colorado apportionment case the Court described the at-large district for electing
eight senators and seventeen representatives in Denver as "undesirable" because ballots were "long and cumbersome," "an
intelligent choice among candidates for seats in the legislature
was made quite difficult," and voters had no single legislator
"elected specifically to represent them." But the Court's remarks
were intended to explain the voters' rejection of an apportionment plan based on population, and the Court specified that it
was not intimating that at-large elections "are constitutionally
defective."3 The Court made no reference in this decision to the
possible effects of at-large elections on minority representation.
Earlier, in the case of Westberry v. Sanders pertaining to congressional elections, the Court said that the principle of "one
man, one vote" is "followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis .... 32
A three-judge federal district court and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court have both declared invalid an apportionment
law enacted in 1964 by the Pennsylvania legislature. The Supreme
Court on November 16, 1964, vacated the decision of the district
court 33 and remanded the case for further consideration. In
effect this action supported the decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to give the legislature until September, 1965,
34
to enact a more equitable apportionment for the 1966 elections.
The district court had held that the use of both single-member
29

There are several recent

examples of federal or state courts approving

multi-member districts, at least implicity. Moss v. Burkhart 220 F. Supp. 149, 160
(W.D. 01. 1963), aff 'd sub nom. William v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964), Baker
v. Carr, 222 F. Supp. 684 (M.D. Tenn. 1963), Davis v. McCarty, 388 P.2d 480,
481 (OH. 1964).
30377 U.S. 533, 577, 579 (1964).
31 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713,
731 (1964).
32376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
33
Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
34
Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556 (1964).
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and multi-member districts in the apportionment of one house
violates the principle of one man, one vote although there would
be no objections if all districts were multi-member and elected
the same numberY5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had indi-

cated that in certain circumstances the arbitrary creation of both
kinds of districts might be constitutionally objectionable although
multi-member districts are not inherently unconstitutional. It
suggested that the
use of single-member districts would be
"more prudent.3 6 Neither court emphasized the implications of
multi-member districts for minority representation.
Plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania case argued in the district court
that voters in multi-member districts are discriminated against
because they lack an intimate, personal relationship with a
single legislator and do not have a clear choice between two men
in the election. They also argued that the weight of each vote
is diluted in a multi-member district.3 The judges in the district
court agreed that voters in single-member districts derive an advantage from more direct contact with legislators. But they declared that the use of both kinds of districts invalidated the one
man, one vote principle because it discriminated against voters
in single-member districts. The district court asserted that the
voter in a four-man district would have four legislators "who
will be especially concerned with his views and interests and
amenable to his persuasion," while the voter in a single-member
district will have only one representative "to express his views
and espouse his interests. 28 The evident confusion about which
category of voters has greater access to and influence over legislators suggests that, in the absence of research on the question,
it is not a suitable one for judicial determination.
Plaintiffs in the Pennsylvania case raised the question of
minority representation in the district court. They asserted that
the multi-member district is a technique for submerging the
vote of a minority party and that its selective use has a discriminatory effect. They charged that the Republican legislature had
used multi-member districts in Republican counties while pro35 Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 326-27 (M.D. Pa. 1964).

36Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 572-73 (1964).
3

7 Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 7-11, Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D.

Pa. 1964).
38 Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 327 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
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viding single-member districts in Democratic counties.3 9 Attorneys for the state of Pennsylvania did not deny that multimember districts have these effects. They argued that, while it
is "a perfectly legitimate political objective to seek assurance of
minority representation," "this is not the political philosophy
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" and is not required by the
United States Constitution. 40 The district court agreed with the
plaintiffs: "Minority groups living in particular localities may well
be submerged in elections at large . . .;" it also concluded that
the use of single-member districts in some large counties and
multi-member districts in others might constitute "gerrymandering for partisan advantage." 4' But the district court appeared to
emphasize these factors less in its decision than the discrimination against residents of single-member districts.
A second case concerning multi-member districts arose in
Georgia, where the legislature responded to judicial pressure in
October, 1962, by reapportioning the Senate and for the first
time allotting more than a single senator to each of several
counties. The legislature divided each large county into senatorial districts and provided that each senator must be a resident of his district, but it also provided that senators in a multimember county would be elected by all the voters in the county.
Although this differs slightly in its mechanics, the effect is almost the same as a multi-member district in which each candidate runs for a specific place or position. A complicated legal
tangle, involving both federal and state courts, ensued. After
a state judge interpreted the language of the state constitution
to require district elections, the voters in November, 1962, approved a constitutional amendment permitting county-wide
voting. In April, 1964, a three-judge federal district court declared
that the requirements for at-large elections in multi-member
counties was unconstitutional, 42 but on January 18, 1965, the
Supreme Court reversed this decision.
The district court ruled that the county-wide elections were
unconstitutional because the law was "applied differently to
different persons. The voters select their own senator in one class
39 Brief for Plaintiffs, 9-13.

40 Brief for Defendants, 39-40.
41
42 Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310, 326-27 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
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of districts. In the other they do not. They must join with others
in selecting a group of senators and their own choice of a senator
may be nullified by what voters in other districts of the group
desire."43 The Supreme Court decided, however, that in the
multi-member counties of Georgia the districts served only as a
basis for residence of the candidates and that the legislators were
elected by and responsible to all members of the county, as in
any other multi-member constituency. The Court reiterated its
belief that approximate mathematical equality could be achieved,
and in this case was achieved, between voters in single-member
and in multi-member districts.44
The districting question in Georgia has obvious implications
for the representation of racial minorities, a fact that was recognized during legislative debate over districting. In an earlier
case at the district court level a brief was fied asserting that a
county-wide election would violate the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments because it "results in invidious dilution of a voter's
vote due solely to his race." The judges recognized that the brief
presented "serious questions," but they made no ruling on the
issue. In the more recent Fortson case the appellees based their
claim on the fourteenth amendment, and made only passing
reference in a brief to discrimination against racial and political
minorities. As the Supreme Court noted, they "never seriously
pressed this point below and offered no proof to support it, the
District Court did not consider or rule on its merits, and in oral
argument here counsel for appellees stressed that they do no rely
on this argument."'5
The question of minority representation remains an elusive
aspect of multi-member districting, but one that has not escaped
the attention of the Supreme Court. The most significant part of
the Court's opinion might be viewed as an invitation to litigation on this question: "It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under
the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it
will be time enough to consider whether this system still passes
431d. at 263.
485

Sup. Ct. 498 (1965).

45Id. at 501.

1965]

MnoB~rY REPRESENTATION

constitutional muster."46 The stage appears to have been set for
judicial examination of the impact that multi-member districting has on minority voters.
One technique that is available for partisan or racial minorities in multi-member legislative districts (where a "place" system is not used) is the casting of a "single-shot" ballot. By
voting for one or perhaps a few candidates, but for fewer than
the total seats to be filled, a minority group may be able to elect
one or more of its choices. This prospect is enhanced in a primary election if there are a large number of candidates, and it
is a technique sometimes used by Negro groups in state or local
elections. In South Carolina and Louisiana this tactic is prevented by legislation invalidating the ballot of any person who
votes for fewer persons than are to be nominated or elected to
an office. The South Carolina law, as it applied to legislative
elections in multi-member districts, was challenged in a federal
district court. There were only two Republican candidates in
Richland county for ten House seats. The petitioners claimed
that the law making it impossible for voters to cast votes only
for the candidates of their choice-the two Republicans-deprived
voters of the liberty of political choice guaranteed by the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. It was also claimed that the principle of freedom of association under the due process clause was abridged by legislation that discouraged candidacies from minor parties and party
voting by members of minority parties. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of equity, and the Supreme Court
refused to review the case. 41 There appears to be no judicial
protection for the "single-shot" approach to minority representation, where it is barred by law.
Although there is as yet no certainty that the courts are
willing to provide judicial protection for minority representation,
there is evidence of judicial willingness to approve legislative
enactments that serve that end. A new city charter in New York
provided for the election of some councilmen by single-member
districts and the election of two councilmen at-large in each of
the five boroughs. The voters would be permitted to vote for
46 Id.
47

Boineau v. Thornton, 85 Sup. Ct. 151 (1964).
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only one of the councilmen running at-large in each borough.
This plan was designed specifically to insure one minority-party
councilman from each borough and to offset in part the lopsided
majority enjoyed by the majority Democratic party in New York
City. The New York Court of Appeals determined that this
system of limited voting violated neither the state constitution
nor 48the fourteenth amendment. 8 The United States Supreme
Blailde v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d 184, 193 N.E.2d 55, 243 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1963).

Court dismissed the case for want of a substantial federal question.49
A QUESTION FOR TIE COURTS
The absence of standards for defining or measuring partisans
or racial gerrymandering should be sufficient reason to remove
this issue from judicial purview. Those judges who have reviewed
the question of multi-member districts have tried to weigh the
effectiveness or power of the votes cast by persons living in
single-member and multi-member districts. Lacking firm evidence
and operating on the basis of conjecture and vague political
theories, the courts have reached conclusions that are contradictory and confusing. At present the courts lack the theoretical
and factual foundation for determining whether the combination of both single-member and multi-member districts in a legislative house deprives voters in either type of district of any
constitutional rights.
The one aspect of districting that has escaped judicial study
is the question of minority representation in a multi-member district, and it is the only question that is ripe for judicial determination. The use of multi-member districts has the clear effect of
reducing the likelihood that voters belonging to a minority
party or a minority racial group can elect legislators of their
choice. The greater the number of legislators elected at large
in any district, the more the effective vote of these minorities
is decreased. This effect of districting is definable and measurable by the courts. It is true, of course, that the courts cannot
determine this question without making policy judgments. But
the principle of one man, one vote constitutes a determination of
policy concerning the representational system, one that contra49

Blaikie v. Power, 375 U.S. 439 (1964).
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diets the policy of protecting rural minorities implicit in the apportionment systems used by many states in the past. Perhaps
the courts should make another policy decision about the representational system, one that is probably less of a departure from
theory and practice in the American states. Perhaps the courts
should decide that the districting mechanism ought to encourage the representation of those partisan and racial interests
that are substantial in size and geographic concentration. In
other words, the courts might well consider whether the right
to an effective vote is unconstitutionally impaired if a districting system deprives voters who constitute a substantial minority
in a county of the chance to elect any legislators of their choice.
Should the courts determine that some minorities have a right
to an effective vote, they need not invalidate all multi-member
districts. Nor would it be necessary to determine the maximum
number of legislators that could be chosen at-large in a district,
any more than the Supreme Court has considered it necessary
to determine a maximum permissible deviation for equal population of legislative districts. The size and concentration of either
partisan or racial minorities would be relevant factors. The
homogeneity of a county might be another. (Does it include both
suburbs and low-income housing or only one?) The criterion of
invidious discrimination might be used to invalidate only those
large multi-member districts in which the votes of large minority
groups are effectively swallowed up. If the courts invalidated the
most blatant examples of districts that devalue the votes of a
minority, the legislative majority in other states might be more
willing to yield to minority pressures and reform the districts.
The courts might well determine that both majority and minority
interests might be served by the use of multi-member districts
in one legislative house.
The choice of districts is essentially a political question, but,
like the question of reapportionment, it is not necessarily one
that can be solved in the legislature or at the ballot box. Republican legislators who fall short of a legislative majority because they are unable to elect members in at-large Democratic
districts are unlikely to be successful in persuading the Democratic majority to change the law. Negro voters are unlikely to
be able, through political means, to force a districting within the
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great majority of southern counties where legislators are now
chosen at large. The tides of reapportionment are making the
problem ever more acute because metropolitan counties are
electing an increasing number of legislators. As this trend continues, the problems of representation will increasingly become
problems of districting within metropolitan counties rather than
apportionment among counties.

